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Michael Tonry
Why Crime Rates Are
Falling throughout the
Western World
A B S T R A C T
Crime rates have moved in parallel in Western societies since the late Mid-
dle Ages. Homicide rates declined from 20 to 100 per 100,000 population in
western Europe to one per 100,000 in most Western countries by the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. Crime rates in major cities and in coun-
tries fell from the early nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth.
From the 1960s to the 1990s, rates for violent and property crimes rose in
all wealthy Western countries. Since then, rates in all have fallen precipi-
tately for homicide, burglary, auto theft, and other property crimes. The
patterns appear in both police and victimization data. Rates for nonlethal vi-
olence have fallen sharply in the English-speaking countries and parts of
continental Europe. In other parts of Europe, nonlethal violence has been
stable or increasing, but the data are probably wrong. Interacting changes in
rates of reporting and recording and in cultural thresholds of tolerance of
violence that occurred earlier in the English-speaking countries are the like-
liest explanation for the appearance of crime rate increases. Diverse explana-
tions have been offered for both the long- and short-term declines. Most
agree that, whatever the explanations may be, they do not include direct ef-
fects of changes in policing or sanctioning policies.
Almost no one except a handful of academic specialists seems to have
noticed that crime rates are falling throughout the Western world.
Electronically published October 29, 2014
Michael Tonry is professor of law and public policy, University of Minnesota. He
is the grateful beneficiary of data, advice, and assistance from many people including
Anthony N. Doob, Manuel Eisner, Mike Hough, Julian Roberts, Rossella Selmini,
Tapio Lappi-Seppa¨la¨, and the late and sorely missed Hanns von Hofer.
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2 Michael Tonry
That is curious. It should be seen everywhere as good news. Fewer
people are victimized. Fewer are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and
punished. Hospital emergency rooms handle fewer intentional injuries.
Insurance companies compensate fewer losses. Politicians have less in-
centive to propose and policy makers to adopt severe policies aimed at
pleasing, placating, or pacifying an anxious public.
No one has a really good explanation for why crime rates are falling.
Since few people have noticed that they are, this is not entirely sur-
prising. Why crime rates are falling may in any case be the wrong
question. The better question may be, Why did crime rates rise in all
developed Western countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s be-
fore peaking and turning downward? There is nearly incontestable evi-
dence that homicide rates fell dramatically and more or less continu-
ously from the late Middle Ages through the middle of the twentieth
century (Eisner 2003; Spierenburg 2008, 2012; Muchembled 2011).
Few historians question that rates for other crimes fell from the early
nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth (e.g., Gurr, Gra-
bosky, and Hula 1977). Those findings support a hypothesis that the
rising rates of recent decades were an anomaly. The centuries-long
downward trend has been interrupted before by profound social and
economic dislocations. Crime rates usually fall during wars, for ex-
ample, rise for a short period afterward, and then resume long-term
patterns (Archer and Gartner 1976, 1984; Gurr 1981, pp. 344–46).
Well-known social and economic dislocations of recent decades af-
fected all developed countries and may simply have caused another
short-term disruption to the long-term trend.
My aims in this essay are to demonstrate that crime rates have moved
in parallel in the English-speaking countries and western Europe since
the 1960s and to assess the main explanations for why they rose in the
1970s and 1980s and fell afterward.1 The implications are important.
One is that Western countries are much more closely linked in struc-
tural, social, and cultural ways than is commonly recognized. Many
demographic patterns in recent decades have characterized most or all
developed countries including rising life expectancies, female labor
force participation, and income inequality and declining fertility, infant
1 The “English-speaking countries and western Europe” are my primary focus. That
lengthy phrase is mostly used in lead sentences. Proximate references to “countries”
should be understood to refer to English-speaking countries and western Europe unless
other countries or regions are explicitly mentioned.
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Why Crime Rates Are Falling 3
mortality, and marriage rates. It would be odd if crime trends were not
also common. All Western countries (and many others) appear to
march to the same distant drummers without realizing that is what
they are doing.
A second implication is that many of the things that governments
have done to reduce crime rates in recent decades have been largely
epiphenomenal—normatively and politically important, and having
major effects on many people’s lives, but pretty much beside the point
in terms of crime rates and patterns. It is at least a little parochial, for
example, that the US National Academy of Sciences twice in recent
years has sought to explain recent American crime trends primarily in
terms of distinctively American developments such as mass imprison-
ment, policing initiatives, legalization of abortion, and reduction in
children’s exposure to lead paint (e.g., Goldberger and Rosenfeld 2008;
Rosenfeld 2014).
Comparison of American and Canadian developments makes the pa-
rochialism clear. Canadian crime rate patterns have closely paralleled
America’s since 1960, but Canada’s imprisonment patterns and crimi-
nal justice policies have been starkly different (Webster and Doob
2007). Since 1960, the Canadian imprisonment rate has fluctuated
around 100 per 100,000 population, while America’s rose from 150 per
100,000 in 1970 to 756 in 2007. Canadian agencies have not empha-
sized zero-tolerance and other aggressive forms of policing, and the
Canadian Parliament did not enact three-strikes, truth-in-sentencing,
and life-without-possibility-of-parole laws. Only in the last couple of
years have significant mandatory minimum sentence laws been enacted;
they do not, however, require sentences measured in decades and life-
times and are meeting strong resistance from the appellate courts (R.
v. Smickle, 2013 Ontario Court of Appeals 677 [CanLII]; R. v. Nur,
2013 Ontario Court of Appeals 678 [CanLII]; Doob and Webster
2013).
Yet crime rates moved in tandem. Figure 1 shows US and Canadian
homicide, robbery, and imprisonment rates since 1960. The US im-
prisonment rate nearly quintupled; the Canadian rate barely changed.
Homicide rates, however, moved almost in lockstep. Robbery trends
also were closely similar. Whatever caused homicide rates in the two
countries to change in parallel, it was something other than changes
in imprisonment rates and sentencing laws. Yet both US National
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FIG. 1.—Imprisonment, homicide, and robbery rates per 100,000 population, Canada and United States, 1960–2012. Sources: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Statistics
Canada; Walmsley (2013, table 1). US imprisonment rates do not include county jail inmates and understate total US imprisonment by approximately one-third.
Reasonably reliable annual jail population data are unavailable before the 1980s.
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Academy of Sciences initiatives have sought to explain American crime
trends as if the reasons for them are uniquely American.
Reasonable arguments can be made that recent drops in property
crime rates were influenced by improved security technologies in mo-
tor vehicles, residences, and retail stores (e.g., van Dijk, Tseloni, and
Farrell 2012b; Farrell, Tilly, and Tseloni 2014). Those developments
may explain minor differences in trends between countries that
adopted them more and less extensively or at different times, but all
developed countries experienced substantial declines. Few plausible ar-
guments can be made, however, that technological or crime control
policy changes have caused sharp parallel declines in homicide and
other violent and sexual offending. Something more fundamental is
happening.
The evidence that crime rates have moved in parallel in Western
countries between the 1960s and 1990s, with occasional lags in partic-
ular countries, is overwhelming. No informed person disagrees that
homicide rates rose from various starting points in the 1950s and
1960s, peaked in the 1990s, and have since fallen (e.g., Eisner 2008,
2014). No informed person disagrees that nonviolent property crime
rates—burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft—in all Western countries
have been falling at least since the 1990s (van Dijk and Tseloni 2012).
In some countries including the United States, there are good reasons
from victimization data to believe that property crime declines began
earlier.2 The declines in property crime rates are especially striking
since they continued during the recessions that afflicted almost all
Western countries beginning in 2008 and are continuing in many as
these words are being written.
The disagreements concern trends in nonhomicidal violence and
sexual offending since the early 1990s. In the English-speaking and
some western European countries, both police and victimization data
show that robbery, rape, and aggravated assault rates have fallen since
the early to mid-1990s. In other western European countries, rates for
nonhomicidal violence have not fallen since the early 1990s and in
2 The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1994) published a report on victimization trends
for 1973–92 (a major redesign of the National Crime Victimization Survey took effect
the latter year). It showed that all forms of theft and household burglaries peaked in
the early 1980s and then began the long-term trends that continue today. Rape and
robbery peaked and began to fall in the mid-1980s but experienced small increases in
the late 1980s, paralleling official data. Motor vehicle theft rates rose until the early
1990s. Only assault rates remained broadly stable.
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some have increased (e.g., Aebi and Linde 2010, 2012). The challenge
is to explain those divergent patterns.
The explanation is that there is no divergence. The appearance of
one is misleading. The incidence not only of homicide but of all violent
crime is almost certainly falling in all developed Western countries, but
this is obscured in three interrelated ways. First, victims have become
more likely to report incidents to the police, but the timing of the
increases varies between countries. Victimization surveys regularly ask
respondents to indicate whether they reported incidents to the police.
In the American national surveys, reporting rates for rape and domestic
violence increased in the 1970s; after the mid-1980s, reporting rates
for violent and sexual offenses increased substantially. Among the ef-
fects are that apparent increases in violent crime in the 1970s and 1980s
were exaggerated and recent declines have been substantially under-
estimated. The most comprehensive analysis concludes that, when
changes in victim reporting are taken into account, nonlethal serious
violence decreased by 51 percent between 1991 and 2005. Police data
indicate only a 27 percent decline (Baumer and Lauritsen 2010, p. 173).
Similar patterns of increased levels of reporting to the police have been
documented in England and Wales and Scandinavia, other places
where annual victimization surveys have long been conducted (Chap-
lin, Flatley, and Smith 2011; Kivivuori 2014). As in the United States,
apparent rate increases in official crime data have been exaggerated and
decreases underestimated.
Second, net of changes in victim reporting, police recording prac-
tices have changed in ways that artificially increase crime rates. Partly
this is the result of professionalization of police management and the
related shift over 40 years from paper to electronic record keeping
(Reiss 1992; Mastrofsky and Willis 2010). Recording rates for most
crimes have increased, but more for some than for others. Domestic
violence and sexual offenses are the paradigm cases, but other violent
offenses are affected. No one who has lived through recent decades
can fail to recognize that people in Western societies (at least) have
become much less tolerant of intimate violence, violence against
women, and sexual offenses generally (Pierotti 2013). Both for public
relations reasons—to forestall criticism of police insensitivity—and be-
cause police are part of society and inevitably are affected by changing
cultural attitudes, some kinds of incidents have become more likely to
be officially recorded as crimes.
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In some countries, policy decisions have been made to increase re-
cording rates. Two major recent changes were made in England and
Wales. In 1998–99, counting rules were changed to record more minor,
or “summary,” offenses particularly for less serious violent crimes,
frauds, and drug offenses. The Home Office estimated that the change
increased crime statistics overall by 14 percent. However, there were
wide variations by type of offense. Burglary and robbery were esti-
mated to have been little affected but other violence against the person
to have increased by 118 percent (Povey and Prime 1999). Hough,
Mirrlees-Black, and Dale (2005, p. 28) later observed that the changes
“would have taken several years to bed in . . . [and] will have artificially
inflated the count of crimes each year.”
In 2002, the National Crime Recording Standard was introduced.
England and Wales shifted from operating an “output” system in which
police apply established criteria before recording incidents as crimes
to an “input” system in which citizens’ reports are taken at face value.
The aim was to make the process more victim-oriented. The Home
Office estimated that the change increased total crime rates by 10 per-
cent in 2002/3, but as with the 1998–99 change, the effects varied
between types of crime and were predicted to be especially significant
for violent crimes (Simmons and Dodd 2003).
Third, cultural thresholds of tolerance have been changing since at
least the 1960s. Behaviors now regarded as appropriately reported to
police were in earlier times often regarded as unpleasant, undesirable,
or socially unacceptable but not as criminal. Well-known examples in-
clude violence within domestic relationships, fights between acquain-
tances or drinking partners, and unwanted sexual touching in public.
If the cultural meanings of such behaviors change over time, people at
different times will use the same words to describe wrongful acts but
mean different things. Here, too, domestic violence and sexual assaults
are the paradigm cases. Had there been national victimization surveys
in the 1960s, for example, respondents would have been much less
likely than now to have thought of a blow from a husband, wife, or
partner as an assault. Many victims of domestic violence or of bar fights
would not have considered themselves to be crime victims and said
“no” if asked if they had been assaulted. Many more such people in
the 1980s and even more in the 2000s would have answered “yes.”
Issues of reporting and recording by definition would not have been
raised in the earlier period for behaviors not then thought of as crimes.
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The social meaning of assault would have changed even though re-
spondents themselves did not realize that they now considered behav-
iors to be criminal that earlier they would not have.
Similar changes are likely to have occurred concerning a wide range
of sexual incidents especially including allegations of nonstranger rapes
and attempted rapes in dating and acquaintance relationships. Femi-
nists worked hard in the 1970s and 1980s to expand cultural concep-
tions and legal definitions of rape (Estrich 1987). No reasonable person
can believe that their efforts were unsuccessful. Something similar oc-
curred in relation to child abuse. Rates of reported child physical and
sexual abuse increased enormously in the United States in the 1980s
as the result of a succession of new laws requiring social workers, psy-
chologists, nurses, doctors, and psychiatrists to report suspected inci-
dents to the police (Garbarino 1989; Brosig and Kalichman 1992; Kal-
ichman 1999). After the early 1990s, recorded rates of child physical
and sexual abuse plummeted. Between 1992 and 2004, reported phys-
ical abuse fell by 43 percent and sexual abuse by 49 percent (Finkelhor
and Jones 2006, fig. 1).
Taken together, changes in reporting, recording, and cultural thresh-
olds of tolerance in recent decades have increased official crime rates
substantially in all developed countries. Those increases are, however,
likely to have occurred at different times in different places. Their
effects on official crime rates were largely manifest in the United States
and some other countries by the early and mid-1990s. In other places,
including many western European countries, they occurred and are
occurring later. It is difficult, for example, not to hypothesize that all
three mechanisms are major causes of recent increases in rates of sexual
offending and assaults in official data in the Scandinavian countries
(Selmini and McElrath 2014). Sexual crimes are the targets of major
social and political movements there and the subjects of important
changes in criminal laws and practices (Skilbrei and Holmstro¨m 2011,
2013; Tham, Ro¨nneling, and Rytterbro 2011). It would be astonishing
if those initiatives had no effects on cultural attitudes, victim behavior,
and police policies and practices.
In this essay, I provide evidence that supports the preceding asser-
tions. Section I summarizes the literature concerning a many-centu-
ries-long decline in homicide rates through the mid-1950s, after which
rates increased in all developed Western countries. Section II docu-
ments declines in homicide rates beginning in the 1990s, declines in
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rates since then for all crimes in many countries, and discordant evi-
dence of increases in violence rates in a few. Section III canvasses rea-
sons why the apparent increases in violence rates in some countries are
much more likely to be the effects of changes in recording, reporting,
and cultural thresholds of tolerance than of real increases. Section IV
briefly explores the underdeveloped literature that attempts to explain
both long-term and recent falls in rates of property and violent crimes.
The explanations are simultaneously simple and complex. The simple
explanations center on secular subjects including situational crime pre-
vention initiatives and target hardening, the bureaucratization of mod-
ern life, and cultural shifts that are denunciatory of crime and violence.
The complex explanations concern interactions among cultural and
secular changes that have influenced capacities for informal social con-
trol and individual self-control (Baumer and Wolff 2014; Eisner 2014).
I. The Long-Term Decline in Crime Rates
A massive body of evidence shows that crime rates have long been
declining. For periods before the establishment of institutionalized sys-
tems of official data, mostly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
studies focus almost entirely on homicide. Work on periods after 1800
encompasses other violent and property crimes. In our time, official
data series have been standardized and strengthened and in many coun-
tries have been augmented by data from representative national victim-
ization surveys. Taken together, they show a steady decline of homicide
rates over many centuries, declines in a wide range of offenses from
the early nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, rises in rates
of all crimes during the 1970s and 1980s, and falls in property crimes
and homicide since the early 1990s. The only disagreement concerns
nonlethal violence and sexual offenses since the early 1990s.
There is nothing controversial about the assertion that homicide
rates declined substantially and continuously after the late Middle
Ages. Pioneering work by the Swiss historian Manuel Eisner (2003),
recently popularized by Steven Pinker (2011), provides almost unchal-
lengeable evidence through the nineteenth century. Work by American
political scientist Ted Robert Gurr and others demonstrated remark-
ably parallel crime patterns in several Western countries from the early
nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth (Gurr et al.
1977).
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In a classic Crime and Justice article, Gurr (1981) offered evidence of
a long-term decline in homicide rates in England between the thir-
teenth and twentieth centuries. For the earliest periods, Gurr calcu-
lated homicide rates for a few years or decades on the basis of work
by English historians reporting data from coroners’ and court records.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, he drew on data from
official records. Figure 2, reprinted from Gurr’s article, shows the re-
sults. The dots represent estimates based on individual studies; the
solid line beginning in the nineteenth century is based on official rec-
ords. Homicide rates averaged more than 20 per 100,000 in the thir-
teenth century, fell below 10 in the seventeenth century, and reached
approximately the modern level of one per 100,000 in most western
European countries in the nineteenth century. Writings on Finland
(Ylikangas 1976), England (Cockburn 1991), Norway (Naess 1982),
Sweden (Osterburg and Lindstrom 1988; Osterburg 1996), and the
Netherlands (Spierenburg 1996) documented similar long-term pat-
terns.
In another classic Crime and Justice article, Eisner (2003) docu-
mented centuries-long homicide declines in Europe beginning in some
places in the fourteenth century. In the 1990s Eisner created the His-
tory of Homicide Database, on which he and most subsequent histo-
rians of long-term homicide trends have since relied. He was motivated
by Gurr’s showing of an apparent long-term decline in English ho-
micide, evidence of similar patterns elsewhere, and speculation that
something similar had happened throughout Europe. By 2003, Eisner’s
database contained 390 estimates of premodern homicide rates based
on more than 90 publications. Figure 3, reprinted from Eisner’s essay,
shows the English data. It resembles figure 2 from Gurr but is based
on many more studies and estimates. Separate figures for Scandinavia,
the Netherlands and Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, and Italy
showed comparable declines throughout Europe. The broad pattern
was everywhere the same, but the timing varied: homicide rates in
Scandinavia reached the contemporary level of one per 100,000 earli-
est, by 1800, and in Italy reached that level last—only in the twentieth
century. By 2014, the database included 823 estimates of homicide rates
during the period before creation of official national data sets (Eisner
2014). Figure 4, using the updated database, shows long-term declining
homicide rates for most regions in western Europe: the patterns are
everywhere the same, but the timing varies.
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FIG. 2.—Homicide rates per 100,000 population, England, 1200–1980. Reprinted from Gurr
(1981, p. 313, fig. 1). Each dot represents the estimated homicide rate for a city or county for
periods ranging from several years to several decades. See Gurr (1981) for details on sources.
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FIG. 3.—Homicide rates per 100,000 population, England, 1200–1990.Reprinted fromEisner
(2003, p. 96, fig. 3). See Eisner (2003, 2014) for details on sources.
Gurr and colleagues had earlier looked at official data on crime in
London, New South Wales (Sydney), and Stockholm and found that
rates for all offenses declined substantially during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries (Gurr et al. 1977). In England, which had the
most extensive official record systems, rates of recorded crime, convic-
tions, and imprisonment fell substantially. This was widely recognized
in the late nineteenth century; French newspapers referred to it as the
“English miracle” (Radzinowicz and Hood 1986). Zehr (1975, 1976)
demonstrated a somewhat similar pattern for France.
American scholars writing in the 1980s and 1990s confirmed for the
United States the pattern that Gurr and his colleagues had shown for
London, Stockholm, and Sydney (e.g., Lane 1980, 1992; Monkkonen
1981). They described a “U-curve” of falling then rising crime rates
from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries and a twen-
tieth-century “reverse J-curve” of rates that fell for the first 60 years
and then rose for the ensuing 20. Now, of course, we know that official
American rates continued to rise until 1991 and have fallen continu-
ously since.
Criminal justice history is a small field and is not well known among
social scientists who study crime. The field was even smaller in the
1980s. Even so, a handful of writers—Gurr, Lane, and James Q. Wil-
son—tried to make sense of the U- and reversed J-curves. All identified
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FIG. 4.—Homicide rates per 100,000 population, five European regions, 1300–2000. Source:
History of Homicide Database. See Eisner (2003, 2014) for details on sources.
social or economic developments that, they argued, successively
strengthened and then weakened individuals’ capacities for self-control.
In retrospect, they did pretty well, anticipating the most plausible the-
ories offered in recent years (e.g., Fukuyama 1999; Pinker 2011; Eisner
2014).
For Gurr (1981, 1989) and Lane (1989, 1992) the fundamental ex-
planation for the nineteenth-century decline was the development of
institutions associated with modernization and the emergence of state
and industrial bureaucracies. These included mandatory public edu-
cation, the military, the factory, other economic institutions of the In-
dustrial Revolution, and the expansion and bureaucratization of gov-
ernment. They also included the full range of modern criminal justice
system institutions: professional police, juvenile training schools and
later on the juvenile court, the reformatory and the prison, and parole
and probation. Altogether, these institutions socialized individuals into
conformity with important norms and helped create a disciplined en-
vironment characteristic of the industrializing cities of the nineteenth
century. After the mid-twentieth century, buffeted by social and eco-
nomic change, they lost their effectiveness.
Lane argued that the nineteenth-century changes altered people’s
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capacities for self-control. They required more orderly, rational, and
cooperative behavior than was necessary for independent farmers,
craftsmen, and small merchants. In a preindustrial society, high levels
of drunkenness, erratic or violent behavior, and unreliability affected
only those immediately involved. Not so in an industrializing society,
in which the work of each depended on what others did:
The state was called in then, and cops in part created to help tame
a formerly unruly population—with special emphasis on drunken-
ness, the kind of victimless crime that private citizens did not
prosecute on their own. The new public schools taught not liter-
acy so much as discipline, as youngsters preparing for regimented
lives in factory or bureaucracy learned to sit still, take turns, mind
the teacher, hold their water, and listen for the bell. The literally
“civilizing” institutions of the nineteenth century, from temperance
societies to a variety of incarcerating institutions, worked to make
the industrial cities function smoothly as far as they did because
they were going with the flow, reinforcing the felt needs of the
new economic order, helping to create an appropriately new kind
of mass social psychology. (Lane 1992, pp. 34–35)
Lane argued that rising crime rates after the 1950s reflected the
shift from an industrial to a postindustrial society; its educational and
technical demands left millions behind. Good blue-collar jobs were
once available to most men who would accept industrial discipline. “It
was never easy,” Lane wrote, “to get young people—especially young
males—to go along with that discipline, and now that there is little
room for those who do not take to purely academic achievement, it is
nearly impossible. The result is that the schools and cops, the injunc-
tions to stay clear of the prevailing drugs, no longer work because they
are no longer serving their former economic function, and much of
the population, suffering from structural un- or underemployment, no
longer accepts the kind of social psychology that built the industrial
city” (1992, p. 35).
James Q. Wilson (1976; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985), by contrast,
paid little attention to economic and structural changes. Instead, he
focused almost entirely on Protestant and Catholic religious revivals
that he argued strengthened socialization into moral norms of right
behavior in the nineteenth century and later lost steam and influence.
The revivals, which he believed improved capacities to delay gratifi-
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cation and resist violent and other wrongful impulses, rested on a
Christian foundation that held during the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. Once personal self-control was weakened by ideas of
moral relativism and norms of hedonistic self-indulgence, things fell
apart: “Parents could no longer socialize their children with the au-
thority conferred by absolute moral standards, young folks lost the
ability to control their impulses, the state, in effect, lost its nerve and
will to punish effectively, and the result was and has been higher crime”
(summarized in Lane [1992, p. 36]).
There the matter rested for a decade. It was only after the realization
began to sink in early in the twenty-first century that crime rates had
peaked in the United States in 1991 and around the same time or
within a few years in other Western countries that scholars began once
again to look for reasons for why crime rates fall.
II. The Recent Rise and Contemporary Fall in Crime
Rates
The recent story is better known. Figure 5 shows homicide, rape, rob-
bery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft rates per 100,000 population in
the United States from 1960 through 2012. So that trends for the five
offenses can be shown in one figure, homicide and rape rates have been
multiplied by 10 and burglary rates divided by 10. With the exception
of burglary, which peaked in 1981 and, despite a slight later increase,
never again reached that level, the patterns for the five offenses are
remarkably similar. They rise and fall, reach peaks and troughs, almost
in lockstep. Rates rose from various dates in the 1960s until 1981, fell
for 5 years, and except for burglary rose again until 1991.3 Since then
they have fallen more or less continuously, including in 2013.
The picture of recent declining crime rates is even more evident in
3 Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) show broadly similar
patterns (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994). Robbery and assault victimization rates
peaked in the early 1980s and again in 1991, falling afterward. Motor vehicle theft
peaked in the early 1990s before beginning a long-term fall. Personal larceny, household
larceny, and household burglary patterns are slightly different; all peaked in the early
1980s and fell continuously in subsequent years. Since the NCVS was redesigned in
1992, victimization rates have declined continuously for all offenses and especially
steeply for violence (Truman and Planty 2012, fig. 3; Lauritsen and Rezey 2013). Victim
reporting to the police increased gradually throughout the period 1973–92 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1994, pp. 1–5) and more sharply from 1991 to 2005 (Baumer and
Lauritsen 2010).
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FIG. 5.—Crime rates per 100,000 population, five offenses, United States, 1960–2012. Source:
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, various years. To show trends for
five offenses in one figure, homicide and rape rates per 100,000 population have been multiplied
by 10. Rates for burglary have been divided by 10.
victimization data. Table 1, based on data from the 1993 and 2010 US
NCVS, shows that reported victimization of individuals for most vio-
lent crimes fell by three-fourths during those years. Household victim-
izations for burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft fell by two-thirds.
The starting date is 1993 because that was the first year of data col-
lection after a fundamental redesign of the survey. Victims’ reports
provide a broader indicator of the extent of victimization than do police
data because they include both attempted and completed crimes, in-
cluding many that victims did not consider serious enough to report
to the police.
The rest of this section demonstrates three propositions. All aim to
demonstrate that the national patterns shown by official data are ac-
curate and that something fundamental was happening that affected all
states and all developed Western countries. First, the American crime
rate patterns shown in aggregate data are broadly representative of the
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TABLE 1
Victimization and Prevalence Rates, per 1,000 Persons Aged 12 or
Older (Violence) or per 1,000 Households (Property), by Type of
Crime, 1993 and 2010
Violence Property
Victimization Prevalence Victimization Prevalence
Total: Total:
1993 79.8 29.3 1993 351.8 171.6
2010 19.3 10.8 2010 125.4 89.2
Rape/sex assault: Burglary:
1993 7.7 2.6 1993 63.9 36.2




1993 8.3 3.9 1993 19.3 12.1
2010 2.2 1.6 2010 4.9 4.3
Aggravated assault: Theft:
1993 16.5 7.6 1993 286.6 136.7




SOURCE.—Lauritsen and Rezey (2013).
experiences of individual American states and major cities. Second,
American patterns of declining homicide and property crime rates
characterize all western European and developed English-speaking
countries. Third, patterns of nonlethal violent crime since the early
1990s appear—albeit misleadingly—to vary substantially between
countries. In the English-speaking and some western European coun-
tries, rates for nonlethal violence have fallen substantially, paralleling
homicide and property crime. In other western European countries,
rates of nonlethal violent crime have either increased substantially or
in any event not fallen (Aebi and Linde 2010, 2012; Selmini and
McElrath 2014). In some countries, including those in Scandinavia,
both police and victimization survey data show increases in rates of
nonlethal violence. Kivivuori (2014) shows, however, that those figures
should not be taken at face value.
A. American Crime Trends in States and Cities
The robustness of American crime rate declines can be seen by look-
ing at patterns in states and cities. In this subsection, I present and
briefly discuss homicide and robbery trends in the five largest states by
population and homicide trends in the 10 largest cities. Because the
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United States includes 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and several smaller territories, “national averages” can be materially
misleading. In the case of crime trends, they are not.
The problem can be illustrated by thinking about imprisonment
rates. The overall state and federal imprisonment rate at year-end 2012,
for example, was 480 per 100,000 population. The national rate, how-
ever, is afflicted by the sad tale of the statistician who drowned in a
lake that was, on average, 3 inches deep. Means can mislead. There
are huge differences in imprisonment rates between states. Maine’s
state imprisonment rate in 2012 was 145 per 100,000. When local jail
inmates are taken into account, the total is about 200 per 100,000.
That is well above the western European average but only slightly
higher than the rates in England, New Zealand, and Spain and lower
than those in much of eastern and central Europe. The highest rates,
Louisiana’s, were 893 per 100,000 when only state prisoners are
counted and over 1,300 including jail inmates. Louisiana has by far the
world’s highest imprisonment rate, more than double those of Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus. Louisiana’s rate in 2012 was also nearly double
the total US rate, including jail inmates, of 717 per 100,000 (Carson
and Golinelli 2013, table 8; Minton and Golinelli 2014, table 1). Im-
prisonment rates in all American states increased substantially after
1973, but the degree of increase and absolute rates varied enormously
(Travis and Western 2014, chap. 2).
For comparison of crime trends, the relevant measure is not absolute
rates but patterns of change. The patterns have been consistent
throughout the United States. Figures 6 and 7 show changes in ho-
micide and robbery rates for the five most populous states since 1980.
More than a third of Americans live in them. Rates are standardized
at one in 1980. Both figures follow the national patterns. Rates peaked
in 1981–82, followed by a drop through the mid-1980s and a late 1980s
climb to a higher peak in the early 1990s. After that the declines were
continuous. In the most recent years, homicide rates were 40–60 per-
cent lower than the starting point and a third to half their peaks. Rob-
bery rates fell to levels 10–60 percent below the starting points and
vastly below the intermediate peaks. The robbery data understate the
declines. Homicide is the most reliably measured crime both because
the indicator is unambiguous and because trends in police data can be
validated with health statistics data on deaths from intentional injury.
Robbery data are much more likely to be affected by changes in victim
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FIG. 6.—Standardized homicide rates per 100,000 population, five most populous American
states, 1980–2012. Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, various
years. Rates have been standardized using state homicide rates in 1980 as bases valued as one.
The figure shows trends in each state relative to its starting point.
reporting and police recording. They are also more likely to be affected
by changes in criminal opportunities such as the increased prevalence
of ownership of mobile telephones and other small electronic devices.
Figure 8 shows trends in homicide for the 10 most populous cities.
Rates are standardized at one in 1990. Most cities experienced small
increases in the early 1990s, followed by continuous falls through 2000.
One clear implication is that “zero-tolerance” and “public order” po-
licing in New York City played at most a small role in reducing ho-
micide rates. During that decade of steep decline, rates in San Diego
and Houston plummeted as precipitously. In the most recent years,
every city’s rate is at least 25 percent below the starting point, most
are 60 percent below, and New York City’s is 80 percent below. New
York’s anomalous 2001 rate results from the World Trade Center
deaths.
B. Cross-National Measures of Victimization and Offending
Quantitative cross-national efforts to compare crime patterns pose
formidable methodological challenges, some of which are discussed in
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FIG. 7.—Standardized robbery rates per 100,000 population, five most populous American
states, 1980–2012. Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, various
years. Rates have been standardized using state robbery rates in 1980 as bases valued as one.
The figure shows trends in each state relative to its starting point.
following subsections. Efforts are being made to establish reasonably
reliable cross-national data systems. These include the UN Surveys on
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (Har-
rendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby 2010), the European Sourcebook of Crime
and Criminal Justice Statistics (Aebi et al. 2010), and the International
Crime Victims Survey (ICVS; van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit 2007).4
The first two remain relatively primitive because of basic cross-national
differences in how crimes are defined and recorded (Alvazzi del Frate
2010 [UN data]; Harrendorf 2012 [European Sourcebook]).
The ICVS has been administered five times beginning in 1989 in a
wide range of countries and cities. The core elements of the survey
instrument are standardized though translated into appropriate lan-
guages. Questions ask about victimization experiences in everyday lan-
guage and neither use nor assume knowledge of statutory offense def-
4 The most successful such cross-national effort, though covering only the Scan-
dinavian countries, is Nordic Criminal Statistics, 1950–2010 (von Hofer, Lappi-Seppa¨la¨,
and Westfelt 2012).
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FIG. 8.—Standardized homicide rates per 100,000 population, 10 most populous American
cities, 1990–2012. Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, various
years. Rates have been standardized using homicide rates in 1990 as bases valued as one. The
figure shows trends in each state relative to its starting point.
initions. Surveys use representative national samples that average 2,000
subjects. Participation rates have varied over the years, typically rang-
ing between 50 and 70 percent. Administering the surveys and analyz-
ing the data of course pose significant methodological and statistical
challenges. Nonetheless, the findings for developed Western countries
are highly consistent and confirm the belief that crime rates have gen-
erally been falling since the early and mid-1990s.
Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the percentages of respondents reporting
victimizations in seven English-speaking and European countries that
participated in four or five ICVS waves. The green and white striped
lines show averages for all countries (not only the seven shown). Figure
9 shows percentages reporting any crime victimization. Figures 10 and
11 show data for one violent offense (assault) and one property offense
(burglary). Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix show results for the
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FIG. 9.—Percentages of respondents reporting any victimization, ICVS, four or five waves, seven and all participating countries. Source: van Dijk et al. (2007,
table 5).
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FIG. 10.—Percentages of respondents reporting assaults, ICVS, four or five waves, seven and all participating countries. Source: van Dijk et al. (2007, table 5)
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FIG. 11.—Percentages of respondents reporting burglaries, ICVS, four or five waves, seven and all participating countries. Source: van Dijk et al. (2007, table 5)
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other two most commonly reported victimizations—auto theft and per-
sonal theft.
All the ICVS figures show the same thing, despite fluctuations at-
tributable to the small sample sizes and—in some countries in some
years—low participation rates: victimization rates rose in most coun-
tries after the 1989 wave of data collection, peaked in the early and
mid-1990s, and have fallen since. This closely follows the patterns
shown in American victimization (see table 1; Truman and Planty 2012,
fig. 3) and police data (see fig. 5).
To round out this survey of broadly cross-national data, figure 12
shows data from the British Crime Survey from 1981 to 2010 for all
property and violent offenses, for serious assaults (involving injuries),
and for the three most common property crimes. England is the only
country outside Scandinavia and the United States that has long con-
ducted annual victimization surveys using large representative national
samples. The patterns for all offenses are the same: rises in the 1980s,
peaks in the early 1990s, and subsequent substantial continuing de-
clines.
Take altogether, the American, English, and ICVS data lay a foun-
dation for at least a tentative hypothesis that crime rates in recent
decades have followed much the same patterns in Western countries
for all crimes and separately for violent and property offenses.
C. Homicide and Property Crime Trends in Western Countries
There is now general agreement, at least for developed English-
speaking countries and western Europe, that homicide patterns have
moved in parallel since the 1950s (Eisner 2008). The precise timing of
the declines has varied, but the common pattern is apparent. Homicide
rates increased substantially from various dates in the 1960s, peaked in
the early 1990s or slightly later, and have since fallen substantially.
Property crime rates have declined everywhere since at least the early
1990s (Aebi and Linde 2010, 2012). I provide illustrative data for the
English-speaking and Scandinavian countries because they, as groups
of countries, provide polar cases.
1. Homicide. Figures 13 and 14 show Scandinavian and English-
speaking country homicide rates, standardized at one on the 1960
rates.5 There are no clear patterns in Scandinavia until the early 1970s,
5 Except for Australia, for which reasonably reliable national data are available only
from 1993 (Carcach 2005).
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FIG. 12.—Victimization rates per 10,000 respondents aged 16 or over, or per 10,000 households, British Crime Survey, selected offenses, 1981–2010/11. Source:
Chaplin et al. (2011, table 2.02).
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FIG. 13.—Homicide rates per 100,000 population, four Scandinavian countries, 1950–2012.
Sources: 1950–2010: von Hofer et al. (2012, table 1); 2011–12: data provided by Tapio Lappi-
Seppa¨la¨.
when rates began to rise in all four countries (least in Finland), peaking
in the early 1990s, and dropping substantially since. Except in Finland,
whose traditionally higher homicide rate ranged between 1.9 and 3.4
per 100,000 population, rates in the other Scandinavian countries fluc-
tuate around one per 100,000. In recent decades they have usually been
lower (von Hofer 2011; von Hofer and Lappi-Seppa¨la¨ 2014). In coun-
tries of 4–8 million people, small differences in absolute numbers cause
noticeable year-to-year rate fluctuations.
English-speaking patterns are similar, albeit with a lagged decline in
England and Wales. Rates in Canada and the United States rose rapidly
beginning in the mid-1960s, peaking around 1980, fluctuating at high
levels during the 1980s, and peaking again in the early 1990s. After
that, they fell sharply, as did Australia’s after 1993. The pattern in
England and Wales is similar except that the peak is a decade later.
The English pattern is substantially affected by the case of Dr. Harold
Shipman, who was convicted of killing 15 of his patients but was later
established to have killed at least 215, with authoritative estimates that
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FIG. 14.—Standardized homicide rates per 100,000 population, four English-speaking coun-
tries, various years to 2012. Sources: Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics; Canada: Statistics
Canada; England and Wales: Office for National Statistics; United States: Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Crime in the United States, various years. Rates have been standardized using
homicide rates in 1960 in England and Wales and the United States, 1961 in Canada, and 1993
in Australia as bases valued as one. The figure shows trends in each country relative to its
starting point.
altogether there may have been more than 260 (Smith 2003). England’s
homicide rate has fluctuated around one per 100,000 for the past 50
years. As in Scandinavia, comparatively small year-to-year differences
in absolute numbers cause significant fluctuations in rates.6 It is im-
portant to recall that figure 14 shows standardized data. American rates
are typically four to eight times higher than those in England and
Wales, three to four times those in Canada, and five to six times those
in Australia.7
2. Property Crime. There is wide agreement that property crimes
6 From 1990 to 1999, the annual number of homicides ranged between 669 and 750
(see table 2 below). After anomalous high absolute numbers in 2001 and 2002, the
rate returned to the prior range and then declined, reaching 553 in 2011 and 552 in
2012 (Office of National Statistics 2013, table 6a).
7 In 1993, e.g., the first year for which Australian data are shown, the American rate
was 9.5 per 100,000, the English 1.31, the Canadian 2.19, and the Australian 1.7. In
2010, the American rate was 4.8, the English 1.12, the Canadian 1.62, and the Australian
1.0.
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are declining in all developed countries, so I do not belabor the point
(van Dijk, Tseloni, and Farrell 2012a). Figures 15 and 16 show trends
for the United States, England and Wales, and the Scandinavian coun-
tries. First, however, a few words about cross-national comparison of
official data are called for.
Countries vary substantially in police recording practices. Even ho-
micide data can be suspect: validation against intentional homicide data
in health statistics shows significant differences even in some developed
countries and huge differences in many less developed countries (Smit,
de Jong, and Bijleveld 2012; Lappi-Seppa¨la¨ and Lehti 2014). Problems
of data comparability are much greater, however, for other offenses
(Aebi 2010; Harrendorf 2012). English-speaking common-law coun-
tries share roughly comparable legal definitions for offenses such as
robbery, burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft. So do the Scandina-
vians. The picture is vastly more complex in the rest of continental
Europe. In some countries, burglary is a subset of theft and sometimes
includes takings from houses, other buildings, and cars. “Motor vehicle
theft” sometimes includes motorcycles, which in some countries are
much more prevalent than in the English-speaking countries. “Rob-
bery” is often not a separate category at all; offenses Americans would
think of as robberies are distributed across a number of separate offense
categories. And so on. Analyses of, for example, police data on motor
vehicle thefts or burglaries in the United States and European coun-
tries are often apples-and-oranges comparisons and are bound to be
misleading unless very careful adjustments are made (Tonry and Far-
rington 2005).8 That is why I use English-speaking and Scandinavian
countries to offer comparisons. Within each set of countries, offense
definitions are broadly comparable.
Even within those sets of countries, figures showing comparative
trend data cannot validly be used as a basis for drawing comparative
8 This is the Achilles’ heel of the admirable European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal
Justice Statistics (Aebi et al. 2010). The police data, compiled according to national
offense definitions, are adjusted to make them comparable to standardized generic
definitions and “checked” by national correspondents for each country: “Each corre-
spondent would be an expert in crime and criminal justice statistics and would act as
a helpline. They would also be entrusted with checking their country’s data to ensure
good quality. . . . They had full responsibility for the accuracy of the data provided
by their respective countries” (p. 16). This means that the reliability of the “compa-
rable” data eventually published depends critically on individuals in each country who
must make adjustments to the official data and inevitably vary in their knowledge,
sophistication, conscientiousness, and idiosyncrasies (Harrendorf 2012).
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FIG. 15.—Victimization survey respondents reporting burglary or automobile theft, England and Wales, since 1981 and household burglary or motor vehicle
theft, United States, since 1980. Sources: England and Wales: Chaplin et al. (2011, table 2.03); Office of National Statistics (2013, table 1.06); Bureau of Justice
Statistics, NCVS. Rates in both countries are per 1,000 households.
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FIG. 16.—Thefts per 100,000 population, four Scandinavian countries, 1950–2012. Sources:
1950–2010: von Hofer et al. (2012, table 5); 2011–12: data provided by Tapio Lappi-Seppa¨la¨.
Rates have been standardized using theft rates in 1960 as bases valued as one. The figure shows
trends in each country relative to its starting point.
conclusions about crime levels. They can be used with greater confi-
dence to compare trends. Crime-level comparisons cannot be made
because recording practices vary. Minor thefts in some countries, for
example, are commonly recorded in police data and in others they are
not. The same differences exist for assaults.
Countries vary in how carefully they screen reported incidents be-
fore deciding whether to record them as crimes. Some operate “out-
put” systems. This means that offenses are recorded only when police
decide that the offense occurred and meets legal definitions. Others
use “input” systems. This means that offenses are recorded as they are
reported, without screening. Not surprisingly, input countries have
higher crime levels than output countries (e.g., Aebi 2008, 2010; Har-
rendorf 2012).
Thus, even among sets of countries that use similar offense defini-
tions, analyses of comparative trend data need to be sensitive to
changes in recording policies. England and Wales, for example, made
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major crime-recording shifts in 1998–99 and 2002–3: to record many
more minor offenses (Povey and Prime 1999) and to shift from an
output to an input system (Simmons and Dodd 2003; Hough et al.
2005). The Home Office estimated that the 2002 change increased
total crime rates by 10 percent in 2002/3 and that the effects were
especially significant for violent crimes (Simmons and Dodd 2003).
Figure 5 showed American motor vehicle theft and burglary trends
in official data since 1960 with rises during the 1960s through the
1980s and steep declines since. Figure 15 shows the same pattern in
victimization data in recent decades for those two offenses in the
United States and England and Wales. I have used victimization data
so as to avoid the effects of the recent English changes in police re-
cording practices. In the United States, burglary victimization rates
declined continuously after 1981 and motor vehicle theft rates after
1991. Rates for both offenses declined continuously in England and
Wales beginning in the early 1990s.
Figure 16 shows similar theft trends in official Scandinavian data
since 1960 standardized to the 1960 rates. Theft and fraud are the only
nonviolent property offenses for which time-series data are readily
available (von Hofer et al. 2012). Rates rose continuously in all four
countries to a peak in the early 1990s and have since fallen substan-
tially.
3. Nonlethal Violent Crime. This is where things become more
complicated. To this point, there is convincing evidence of steady, sub-
stantial declines in lethal violence in Western countries from the late
Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, a continuing decline in rates
for many offenses in selected countries through the mid-1950s, and
rising rates for all major offenses in all developed Western countries
through the early 1990s. Since then, there is convincing evidence of
declines in homicide and the major property crimes in all developed
Western countries (Baumer and Wolff 2014; Farrell et al. 2014; Lappi-
Seppa¨la¨ and Lehti 2014). Concerning nonlethal violence the evidence
is mixed. In the English-speaking countries and some continental Eu-
ropean countries, nonlethal violence as shown in official data is declin-
ing (Aebi and Linde 2010, 2012). Official data in other continental
European countries, sometimes backed up by victimization data, show
increases (see, e.g., Kivivuori 2014; Selmini and McElray 2014).
Figures 17–20 tell the tale. First the English-speaking countries. Fig-
ure 17 shows robbery rates per 100,000 population in official data from
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FIG. 17.—Robbery rates per 100,000 population, four English-speaking countries, various years to 2012. Sources: Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics;
Canada: Statistics Canada; England and Wales: Office for National Statistics; United States: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, various
years.
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FIG. 18.—Respondents per 1,000 reporting victimization by robbery, assault, or aggravated
assault, England and Wales since 1981 and United States since 1980. Sources: England and
Wales: Chaplin et al. (2011, table 2.02); United States: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal
Victimization, various years; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t322010.pdf, table 3.2.2010). Victimization rates for England and Wales are
per 1,000 population aged 16 and older. Victimization rates for the United States are per 1,000
population aged 12 and older.
1960 to the most recent dates for which data are available. Continuous
time series are available for England and Wales and the United States.
Data are shown for Canada and Australia from the years when reason-
ably reliable national data became available (Carcach 2005; Welsh and
Irving 2005). The data for the United States and Canada show sharp
rises through 1991 and significant drops since. The data for England
and Wales show a continuous rise through 1996, followed by a drop
and a subsequent steep rise that is no doubt attributable to the 1998
and 2002–3 changes in counting rules discussed above. After 2002, the
English rates quickly fell by 50 percent. The Australian data show rises
through the early 2000s, followed by a precipitate 60 percent drop.
Figure 18 shows victimization data for robbery, aggravated assault,
and all assaults per 1,000 residents aged 16 and up for recent years in
England and Wales and aged 12 and up in the United States. I use
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victimization data because they are not distorted by changes in English
counting rules. Here the picture is much clearer than in the official
data. In the United States, the trends for all three offenses parallel the
trends shown in official data. The victimization data for England and
Wales closely track the American pattern, with steady drops since the
early 1990s.
As a whole, the data from the English-speaking countries tell a con-
sistent story: violence rates rose substantially until the early and mid-
1990s and dropped substantially afterward. Despite the complexities in
the English data, all four countries show substantial declines in non-
lethal violence in the 2000s.
The Scandinavian story is otherwise. Figure 19 shows robbery rates,
standardized as one on the 1960 rate, from 1960 to 2010. Through the
early 1990s, they parallel the English and American patterns, with steep
rises through the early 1990s, followed by steep declines through the
mid-1990s. After that, however, except arguably for Finland, the pat-
tern is entirely different. Rates rise again in the late 1990s to peaks for
three of the countries in 2000 and, except for Finland, where rates
decline, fluctuate at the new higher level.
The Scandinavian difference is even more acute for assault, as the
standardized data in figure 20 show.9 Except for periods of decline in
the 1990s in Finland and Denmark, the overall pattern is of continuous
increases for 50 years, with the possibility of a change of direction in
the early 2000s. That is too soon to tell.
So there it is. On the face of official data trends, the Scandinavians
have experienced long-term and recent patterns in homicide and prop-
erty crime that parallel those in the English-speaking countries. The
same official data, however, show radically different trends in nonlethal
violence since 1990. Either there are different stories to be told about
crime trends in the English-speaking countries and Scandinavia (and
other continental European countries) or there is one story but it is
obscured by changes in reporting, recording, and changing cultural
thresholds of tolerance. There is only one story: crime rates are falling
throughout the developed Western world.
9 The Scandinavian difference is especially marked concerning sexual offenses in
official data (Selmini and McElray 2014).
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FIG. 19.—Standardized robbery rates per 100,000 population, four Scandinavian countries, 1950–2012. Sources: 1950–2010: von Hofer et al. (2012, table 4);
2011–12: data provided by Tapio Lappi-Seppa¨la¨. Rates have been standardized using robbery rates in 1960 as bases valued as one. The figure shows trends in each
country relative to its starting point.
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FIG. 20.—Standardized assault rates per 100,000 population, four Scandinavian countries, 1950–2012. Sources: 1950–2010: von Hofer et al. (2012, table 2);
2011–12: data provided by Tapio Lappi-Seppa¨la¨. Rates have been standardized using assault rates in 1960 as bases valued as one. The figure shows trends in each
country relative to its starting point.
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III. Why Apparent Rises in Violent Crime Are
Misleading
Changes in cultural thresholds of tolerance, victim reporting of inci-
dents, and police recording of crimes are why violent crime rates ap-
pear, misleadingly, to be rising in some developed Western countries.
In this section, I explain why the true incidence of violent crime is
highly unlikely to be increasing in places where homicide rates are
falling and briefly summarize evidence that suggests that apparent rises
are artifacts of other social phenomena.
Nonlethal violence should be probabilistically associated with lethal
violence in the same way that traffic deaths are with vehicle miles
driven. Both sets of outcomes are products of the law of large numbers.
In a particular place and period, 100,000 potentially violent incidents
should produce predictable numbers of injuries and deaths in the same
way that 100 million motor vehicle miles driven produce predictable
numbers of traffic injuries and deaths.
Traffic injury and death rates per 100 million miles driven change
slowly. They are probabilistic outcomes of driving skills, highway en-
gineering, automotive design, medical trauma care, and random
chance. With so many people driving so many kinds of vehicles on so
many types of roads in any particular country, it would be astonishing
if injury and death rates changed significantly from year to year. They
have been gradually declining in the United States since the 1960s
because all the factors that contribute to them have been changing in
ways that reduce the incidence of accidents. Between 1981 and 2011,
death rates fell by 0.03 percent per year (National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration 2012, table 1). All developed countries including
the United States have strengthened driver training requirements and
targeted drunken driving; social norms about drinking and driving have
changed; year by year, often under governmental mandates, automotive
engineering changes have made cars safer; highway safety engineering
has steadily improved; and the quality of treatment of traumatic injuries
has improved. Without those changes, there is no reason to suppose
that base rates of deaths and injuries would have changed at all.
And so it should be with homicide and nonlethal violence (e.g., Har-
ris et al. 2002). Deaths should be probabilistically associated with the
total number of potentially violent incidents. Franklin Zimring (1972)
demonstrated this four decades ago in an article tellingly entitled “The
Medium Is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death
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from Assault.” To investigate whether firearms affect the outcomes of
violent crimes, he examined Chicago police reports for violent inci-
dents in the late 1960s. He found that the likelihood of death occurring
was probabilistically related to the tools available to an assailant. All
else about an incident being equal, hands are less lethal than knives,
which are less lethal than small-caliber firearms, which are less lethal
than large-caliber firearms.
The data discussed in Section II demonstrate the probabilistic re-
lationship between lethal and nonlethal violence in the English-speak-
ing countries and demonstrate the existence of declining homicide rates
in the Scandinavian countries. Baumer and Wolff (2014) and Lappi-
Seppa¨la¨ and Lehti (2014) demonstrate the existence of declining ho-
micide rates in all developed Western countries. Nonlethal violence
rates should be declining everywhere but appear in some places not to
be. Either the law of large numbers does not apply in Scandinavia and
in some other developed Western countries or the data are misleading.
The data are misleading. The fundamental reason is that there have
been major shifts in cultural thresholds of tolerance of violence. One
manifestation of this is that victims report larger percentages of inci-
dents to the police. Victimization surveys almost always ask victims
whether they have reported incidents to the police. In the United
States and England and Wales, substantial increases in victim reporting
have occurred for all offenses since the mid-1980s, but especially for
sexual offenses and violence.
The most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of NCVS data
on victim reporting concluded that changes in victim reporting have
led to substantial underestimates of the decline in the incidence of
crime in the United States since 1991: “According to UCR data on
nonlethal serious violence (i.e., rape, robbery, and aggravated assault),
the number of violent crimes in the United States decreased by about
27 percent from 1991 to 2005. However, the NCVS suggested a much
larger decrease for these same crimes—about 51 percent” (Baumer and
Lauritsen 2010, p. 173). Because the point is so important, I quote
their main findings:
The overall empirical pattern that emerged from our research in-
dicated that . . . an apparent widespread and important increase
can be observed in the likelihood of police notification in the
United States during the past 30 years. This increase seems to
have been led by a rise in reporting for sex offenses and family vi-
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olence, but we also observed significant increases in police notifi-
cation since the early 1970s for burglary and motor vehicle theft as
well as from the mid-to-late 1980s for nonsexual assaults, violence
against both men and women, larceny, stranger and non-stranger
assaults, [and] robberies committed by non-strangers. (P. 173)
No comparably sophisticated analysis of British Crime Survey data
has been published. Responses to questions about reporting to the po-
lice since 1981, however, show substantial increases, especially for vi-
olence. Figure 21 shows relatively little change in victim reporting for
burglary and motor vehicle theft but—especially relative to the 1981
base year—large ones for theft, minor assault (little or no injury), se-
rious assaults (injury), and domestic violence (Chaplin et al. 2011, table
2.11). For domestic violence incidents, reporting to the police doubled,
increasing from 20 percent in 1981 to 39 percent in 2010/11 and reach-
ing 47 percent in 2009. Reporting of thefts, minor assaults, and serious
assaults increased by half over the entire period and in some interven-
ing years by more.
Comparably long-term, representative annual victimization surveys
with large sample sizes are available in few other countries. Scandi-
navian countries are among them. There, as Kivivuori (2014) shows,
victim reporting to the police has substantially increased since the early
1990s.
A second, multiplicative manifestation of the change in cultural
thresholds is that the police record as crimes more of the incidents that
come to their attention. This can happen as a matter of policy decisions
or as a matter of unplanned—and unrecognized—changes in practice.
Police in English-speaking countries traditionally operated output re-
cording systems; a reported incident was recorded as a crime only if
the police decided that the allegations were “founded,” that is, if they
satisfied legal criteria. An “unfounded” reported incident was not re-
corded as a crime. Input systems record reported incidents without
independent confirmation by the police that a crime occurred. Not
surprisingly, crime rates are higher in jurisdictions with input systems
(Aebi 2008, 2010; Harrendorf 2012).
A number of countries have recently purposely switched from output
to input recording systems. The 2002–3 English shift, which I dis-
cussed earlier, was predicted to increase crime rates generally but es-
pecially for violence (Simmons and Dodd 2003; Hough et al. 2005).
As figure 17 shows for robbery, that is what happened. The principal
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FIG. 21.—Percentages of respondents reporting victimization to the police, six offenses, England and Wales, 1981–2010/11. Source: Chaplin et al. (2011, table 2.01)
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explanation for such shifts is that politicians want more incidents to be
officially counted as crimes.
Police themselves, however, are no less likely than anyone else to be
affected by changing cultural thresholds of tolerance. An English ex-
ample is illustrative. Table 2 shows absolute numbers of the four most
violent crimes recorded by the police between 1991 and 2001: murder,
attempted murder, threat or conspiracy to murder, and “wounding or
endangering life.”10 Panel A shows an upward trend in homicide from
669 deaths in 1991 to 850 in 2001—a 25 percent increase, though
totals in the other intervening years were significantly lower. The 2001
increase is partly attributable to the Harold Shipman killings. Even if
we take the 2001 rate at face value, the increase is much lower than
for other offenses. The number of attempted murders increased by 50
percent, the number of threats and conspiracies by 250 percent, and
the number of woundings and endangerments by more than 70 per-
cent.
That English recording pattern is evidence of unconscious bracket
creep. If homicide has a probabilistic relationship to the most serious
other forms of violence, the increases should have been comparable
for each. Instead, year by year, the relationship between murder and
other forms of serious violence became increasingly attenuated. This
can be seen in panel B. It shows changing ratios of homicides to various
combinations of serious violent offenses. The first row, for example,
shows the total numbers each year of murders and attempted murders.
The second row shows the percentages of those offenses that were
murders. From 1991 to 2001 the homicide proportion fell modestly,
from 58.4 to 54.6 percent. That is not enough of a change to support
any strong inference. The criteria for recording a crime as an at-
tempted murder appear not to have changed much or at all.
It is otherwise for the other offense groupings, as rows 4 and 6 of
panel B show. Among offenses recorded as murders, or as attempts,
threats, or conspiracies to murder, the murder proportion fell from
12.6 to 5.4 percent, more than halving. When all serious violent of-
fenses are considered, the homicide proportion nearly halved, falling
from 4.7 to 2.7 percent.
There are a number of reasons why the proportion of deaths among
10 The table stops in 2001 because the input recording system that took effect in
2002 was predicted to have substantial but unknown effects on recording patterns,
especially for violence.
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TABLE 2
England and Wales, Ratios of Murders to Other Violent Recorded Offences, 1990–2000/2001





A. Recorded Violent Crimes
1. Murder 669 725 687 670 726 745 679 739 748 750 750 766 850
2. Attempted murder 476 555 568 661 651 634 674 652 661 676 676 750 708
3. Threat/conspiracy to
murder 4,162 4,712 5,487 5,638 6,844 7,044 8,533 9,340 9,661 11,112 11,212 13,434 14,064
4. Wounding/ endangering life 8,920 9,408 10,741 10,701 11.033 10,445 12,169 12,531 12,833 13,960 14,006 15,135 15,662
B. Ratios of Murders to Other Violent Crimes
Total 1  2 1,145 1,280 1,255 1,331 1,377 1,379 1,353 1,391 1,409 1,426 1,426 1,516 1,558
1  (1  2) .584 .566 .547 .503 .527 .540 .502 .531 .531 .526 .526 .505 546
Total 1  2  3 5,307 5,992 6,742 6,969 8,221 8,423 9,886 10,731 11,070 12,538 12,638 14,950 15,622
1  (1  2  3) .126 .121 .102 .096 .088 .088 .069 .069 .068 .060 .059 .081 .054
Total 1  2  3  4 14,227 15,400 17,483 17,670 19,254 18,868 22,055 23,262 23,903 26,498 26,644 30,085 31,284
1  (1  2  3  4) .047 .047 .039 .038 .038 .039 .031 .032 .031 .028 .028 .025 .027
SOURCE.—Home Office (2001, table 2.15).
* Per revised classification scheme.
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serious violent incidents might change. Just as changes in drivers’ skills,
drunk driving prevalence, automotive safety, highway engineering, and
trauma care explain why highway injury and death rates have been
declining, equivalent changes might be sought for serious violent in-
cidents. Improvements in trauma care, for example, have made a huge
difference in homicide rates over the past several hundred years and a
significant one over the past 50 (Monkkonen 2001; Harris et al. 2002)
but are unlikely to have caused major declines in deaths from inten-
tional injuries in the past two decades. Changes in the technology of
violence in England and Wales should have increased rather than de-
creased the proportion of fatal injuries; the prevalence of assaultive use
of both guns and knives increased in England and Wales in the 1990s.11
There are no close equivalents to changes in driving skills, automotive
safety engineering, and the other contributors to the drop in auto-
mobile fatalities.
The proportion of homicides among serious violent incidents in En-
gland and Wales declined in the 1990s because the criteria police used
to classify incidents gradually changed. Shifts in cultural attitudes to-
ward violence, equivalent to shifts in cultural attitudes toward drunk
driving, are the likeliest reason. British police increasingly classified
incidents as very serious violence that in earlier years they would not
have.
Something similar happened with less serious violent incidents. En-
glish civil servants have provided detailed statistical evidence that re-
cording of minor assaults by the police increased substantially after
2000. They attribute the increases to the changes in counting rules
discussed above and also to police responses to politicians’ insistence
that greater attention be given to minor violence (Britton et al. 2012).
Similar things have happened in many countries. In the conclusion
to a recent book on the “international crime drop,” Jan van Dijk and
colleagues observe,
In times of declining rates of crime, police forces are inclined to
lower their thresholds for recording cases of less serious crime.
Crime recording in our view tends to be counter-cyclical. This in-
stitutional mechanism seems to account for the remarkable diver-
gences over the past ten or fifteen years between survey results on
assault and police figures on less serious violent crime in the US,
11 Their use has fallen significantly since 2000 (Chaplin et al. 2011).
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Canada, several Western European countries, and Australia/New
Zealand. Almost everywhere a degree of statistical net widening
seems to have taken place, which has inflated the police count of
violent crime. In our view, police figures of violent crime have, in
recent years, been increasingly inflated. (Van Dijk et al. 2012a, p.
305)
Police are no less likely to be affected by shifts in prevailing cultural
attitudes than anyone else. They watch the same films and television
programs, read the same electronic and print media, and are affected
by the same changes in prevailing political and cultural attitudes. De-
clining tolerance of wrongdoing caused crime victims in the United
States, England and Wales, and Scandinavia to become increasingly
likely in recent decades to report incidents to the police. In the United
States, the principal reasons why prison populations rose in the 1970s
and 1980s were that police arrested more people, prosecutors pursued
cases they previously would have dropped and drove harder plea bar-
gains, and judges sentenced more people to prison and for longer times
(Blumstein and Beck 1999). Only later, in the 1990s, were harsher
sentencing laws the primary driver of prison population changes
(Raphael and Stoll 2013; Travis and Western 2014, chap. 3). Those
laws also, however, reflected heightened intolerance of wrongdoing and
more punitive attitudes to it.
If crime victims, police choosing whom to arrest, prosecutors making
case processing decisions, and judges deciding sentences became more
punitive, it would be astonishing if police-recorded crimes were un-
affected by the attitudinal shifts that led to those changes. A rising sea
lifts all things that float, including police boats.
There are thus good reasons to believe that rising official rates of
crime in some countries are artifacts of cultural changes and not of
real increases in violent incidents. The important question then be-
comes, Why have the offense amplification processes described in the
preceding paragraphs occurred later in the Scandinavian (and some
other European) countries than in the English-speaking countries? No
one has been asking that question, so there is little research I can draw
on to suggest answers.
One general hypothesis is that some countries are experiencing de-
layed responses to the rising crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s. Struc-
tural and cultural characteristics of the English-speaking countries
caused them to respond earlier and more harshly. Repressive attitudes
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may both have risen and abated earlier than elsewhere. Tapio Lappi-
Seppa¨la¨ (2008) identified risk factors that especially characterize
English-speaking countries in explaining why imprisonment rates rose
substantially in some countries in recent decades but not in others.
These include conflict versus consensus political systems, politically
accountable prosecution and judicial systems versus apolitical civil ser-
vice ones, expert versus political influence on policy making, and low
versus high levels of trust by citizens in fellow citizens and government.
Relative to most developed Western countries, England and Wales,
New Zealand, the United States, and parts of Australia fall into the
first of each paired set of alternative characteristics. In each, crime
control was an important partisan political issue in the 1980s and es-
pecially the 1990s. This led to adoption and application of repressive
crime control policies (and, with them, steeply rising prison popula-
tions).
A second, related general hypothesis is that the changes in cultural
attitudes that caused long-term violence rates to fall also exacerbated
public anger and resentments when short-term rates rose. The massive
economic, social, and political changes of recent decades that affected
all developed countries caused a several-decade disruption in long-term
crime trends, as wars historically have. The gradual changes in social
attitudes and values that caused violence rates to decline over centuries
also raised thresholds of intolerance. In the English-speaking countries,
especially the United States and England and Wales, politicians har-
nessed public anger to personal and partisan ends. The results in both
countries included overheated political rhetoric, adoption of harsh
crime control policies, and rising prison populations (Tonry 2004a,
2004b, 2010; Downes and Morgan 2012).
In much of Europe, by contrast, politicians and civil servants at-
tempted rationally and humanely to address the challenges posed by
rising crime, increased numbers of cases, enlarged budgets, and over-
stretched facilities (Tonry 2004c, 2007; Lappi-Seppa¨la¨ 2008). The
English-speaking politicians acknowledged public anxiety and anger
and, as David Garland (2001) argued, adopted severe expressive pun-
ishments in response. Politicians in some other countries attempted to
manage and suppress public anger and anxiety. Scandinavian and some
other European countries may now be experiencing the public upset
that might have accompanied an immediate doubling or trebling of
crime rates after the 1960s. Because crime rates rose gradually, and
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their practical consequences were managed effectively, in some coun-
tries public anxiety was delayed. It became manifest only during the
recent decades of declining crime rates.
Delayed public anger and indignation about deviant behavior, lead-
ing to harsh attitudes and policies, have been documented in other
settings. In each of three periods of alcohol and drug prohibition in
the United States since 1850, the most punitive public attitudes, the
harshest new laws, and the most aggressive enforcement practices oc-
curred years after drug use peaked and began to decline. The leading
drug policy historian, David J. Musto (1999), had an explanation.
When drug use was not widely seen as a major problem, many people
argued that it was not as dangerous as others believed and in any case
was a private matter: in a free society, people should be able to do as
they wish as long as they do not harm others. As drug use rose and its
ill effects became more widely recognized, he argued, attitudes began
to harden and prohibitionist sentiments became more prevalent. Social
norms began to change and at a tipping point caused drug use to begin
to decline. Fewer people used drugs partly because they feared legal
consequences. Partly, however, they stopped because they came to be-
lieve drug use to be wrong. As the decline continued, attitudes became
progressively harder. Few people any longer believed, or at least would
publicly argue, that use of illicit drugs is acceptable or harmless.
This social consensus reinforced the decline in drug use, weakened
opposition to harsh policies, and added a tone of fierce moralism to
drug law enforcement. Musto also observed that attitudes began to
soften during the first two prohibition eras, and policies and practices
to moderate, 15–20 years after drug use began to fall. That model also
fits the most recent “war on drugs.” Drug use peaked in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. The harshest policies were enacted between 1984 and
1996 (Tonry 2004b). A similar pattern characterizes American crime
policy. Crime rates fell for 5 years after 1981, then rose until 1991,
and have fallen almost continuously since. The harshest sentencing
laws were enacted in the mid-1990s. As happened with drugs in the
1990s, much of the fervor has disappeared from the politics of crime
and policies have begun to soften (Tonry 2013).
A third hypothesis is that distinctive cultural or political develop-
ments in some countries have caused crime to be treated as a substan-
tively and symbolically more important issue in recent years, thereby
exacerbating awareness of crime and deviance. One result is a process
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of amplification by which harms come to be seen as more serious than
in earlier times. Since the late 1990s, sexual offenses in Scandinavian
countries have received steadily increasing political and ideological at-
tention (Skilbrei and Holmstro¨m 2011, 2013). In both political debates
and the media, crime discourse in Scandinavia is increasingly victim-
centered and moralistic (Tham et al. 2011). The recent emphases on
victims and on sexual offenses may have made victims and police more
sensitive than in earlier times to minor kinds of invasive behavior, cit-
izens more likely to perceive incidents as assaultive when answering
victimization surveys and to report incidents to the police, and police
more likely to treat them as offenses. Selmini and McElrath (2014)
show that sexual offense rates in Scandinavia continued rising long
after they began to fall in many countries. Kangaspunta and Haen
Marshall (2012) reviewed victimization survey data and police statistics
on intimate violence in a number of countries. Surveys consistently
showed declines in violence between intimates. Police statistics showed
increases. They argued that increased recording of intimate violence
has been influenced by worldwide campaigns to reduce violence against
women. Van Dijk et al. (2012a, p. 305) suggest that this is a specific
example of a more general mechanism of net widening by the police
in a period when crime is falling.
The hypothesis that changes in cultural thresholds of tolerance of
violence have amplified its salience is only recently becomingly rec-
ognized. The ideas that victim reporting and police recording change
over time are well known and increasingly well documented. The more
elusive idea that there are changes in cultural thresholds of tolerance,
which are important contributors to higher victimization and crime
rates, is less widely recognized. Kivivuori (2014) provides compelling
evidence about it from the United States, England and Wales, France,
and the Scandinavian countries.
IV. Making Sense of Declining Crime Rates
Substantial changes in crime rates ought to be an important social
indicator. Sharp rises or falls or changes in long-term trends should
tell us things about the health of social systems or about the nature
and effects of major secular changes. This is the kind of subject about
which men and women from Mars would expect there to be a sizable
and sophisticated literature. They would be disappointed. Durkheim
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(e.g., [1893] 1933) had insightful things to say about crime as an or-
ganic outgrowth of social systems and about changes in levels and types
of crime over time, but relatively few theorists have added much that
is useful to his analysis. Garland (1990) stimulated renewed interest in
Norbert Elias’s ([1939] 1978) theory of a civilizing process that un-
folded in Europe from the Middle Ages to modern times, bringing
with it greater attention to hygiene, growing fastidiousness in serving
and eating meat, and reduced use and acceptance of violence. Eisner
showed (2003, 2008) that Elias’s ideas provide at least part of a plau-
sible explanation for the centuries-long decline in homicide rates.
Much of the theoretical work on explanation of crime trends until
recently has been pretty primitive. That was probably inevitable since
even somewhat reliable cross-national data, pertaining mostly to
wealthy developed countries, have only recently become available.
Most theorizing as a result has had to be a priori. Two competing
cross-national sets of theories contended: a “Durkheimian” anomie
theory that modernization weakened primary social bonds and with
them inhibitions against egoistic behavior12 and a Marxissant conflict
theory that exploitative international patterns of economic develop-
ment weakened social bonds and systems, and with that social control,
especially in underdeveloped countries (Neuman and Berger 1988;
LaFree 1999). Gary LaFree (2005), analyzing 45 years of homicide data
from 34 countries, tested “modernization” and conflict theories. He
concluded that homicide trends were becoming more similar in
wealthy developed countries but not in less developed countries and
concluded that an “elite convergence” was occurring.
The articles mentioned in the preceding paragraph are not, of
course, the only ones on the subject, but they are among the most
cited and they give a flavor of the nature of recent theorizing.13 They
12 This is slightly odd. The assumption that modernization and urbanization bring
heightened crime rates with them contradicts the well-known historic pattern that
crime rates were typically lower in the emerging cities of the modern era than in the
countryside (Eisner 2003, pp. 105–6). In another of his intellectual hats, Durkheim
(1982) famously argued that crime is a necessary social construct that every society
needs in order to reinforce core values. As societies change, the content of “crime”
necessarily changes, but the concept would exist even in a society of saints. Thus as
societies evolve, conceptions of crime should change, but the amount of “crime” should
be more or less constant.
13 Another recent theoretical approach has been to test crime trend hypotheses de-
rived from etiological theories of crime. The study by Kivivuori, Savolainen, and Dan-
ielsson (2012) is an especially comprehensive example.
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and others like them have largely been passed by. The historical work
on long-term trends was much less well known when they were writ-
ten. As a result they sought short-term explanations to what we now
know to have been only modulations in long-term trends. Likewise,
the now sizable literature documenting parallelism in homicide trends
in wealthy Western countries did not exist (e.g., Eisner 2008), so their
authors could not have known about it.
The near-absence of a theoretical literature on crime trends is aston-
ishing. Hundreds of thousands of people have spent their lives studying
crime and criminal justice systems, but only comparatively few have
seriously attempted to explain the most striking and consequential
crime developments of the past 50 years: the steep increase in crime
rates in all developed Western countries beginning in the 1960s and
the steep decreases since the early 1990s.
The most persuasive theories are the simplest and hark back to the
writing of Ted Robert Gurr, Roger Lane, and James Q. Wilson in the
1980s. All of them looked for explanations for the U- and reverse J-
curves in social and economic changes likely to have affected social
control processes and shaped capacities for self-control. Eisner showed
that homicide rates fell throughout western Europe more or less con-
tinuously from the late Middle Ages. The timing and trajectories of
decline varied, but most regions converged on a rate of one per 100,000
inhabitants by the beginning of the nineteenth century and almost all
reached it by the beginning of the twentieth. Eisner’s (2003) early
explanations drew elements from Elias’s ideas about a “civilizing pro-
cess.” Later he focused on Max Weber’s ideas about the influence of
the Protestant Ethic in shaping norms and values (Eisner 2008). The
relevant mechanisms included state formation with a state near-
monopoly on legal violence, creation of institutions and processes that
obviated needs for self-help, urbanization, and increasing social inter-
dependence ( Johnson and Monkkonen 1996; Eisner 2003).
Ted Gurr and others (Gurr et al. 1977; Gurr 1981) showed that
crime rates declined generally in major Western cities in the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth. Gurr’s major early works
were written before Eisner’s findings became known, and he therefore
sought not to locate nineteenth-century developments into longer
patterns but to explain developments in the period he studied. In ret-
rospect his explanations fit well with Eisner’s synthesis. The major
contributing causes were increases in social control and self-control
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associated with industrialization, urbanization, modernization, and bu-
reaucratization. The archetypal institutions socializing individuals into
conformity included the public school, the newly invented criminal
justice institutions, the factory, the army, and the bureaucratic insti-
tutions of the modernizing state. Lane’s (1980, 1992) explanations fo-
cused on interdependence and the need for individuals to learn to func-
tion cooperatively. Wilson (e.g., Wilson and Herrnstein 1985) focused
more on the normative underpinnings of cooperative behavior and
found them in religious revivals in the nineteenth century that
strengthened social and self-control by means of socialization into
strengthened moral norms of right behavior.14
Put together, those accounts cumulate into an intuitively plausible
story of how human beings at least in developed countries gradually
became less larcenous and less violent. They do not explain what went
wrong in the 1960s. Francis Fukuyama (1999) provides a plausible ac-
count. Postwar economic expansions produced prosperous and peace-
able years in the 1950s. However, in short order came decolonization
of most of Africa, much of the Caribbean, and parts of South America
and the Middle East; the Vietnam War and youthful rebellions of the
1960s; the civil, women’s, and gay rights movements; economic trans-
formations including the OPEC oil embargos of the 1970s, massive
economic restructuring, and globalization; and vastly increased move-
ments of people between countries. In retrospect it was all too much
to be absorbed in a short time. As Chinua Achebe (1958) described
colonial Nigeria, Things Fall Apart. Crime rates rose as did support in
many countries for neoliberal and xenophobic political movements.
That harsh crime policies emerged in some countries is not surprising.
By the 1990s, however, in most wealthy developed countries the
effects of the preceding decades’ disruptions had largely been absorbed.
Crime rates peaked and began what proved to be precipitate falls. The
historic long-term trend resumed after a several-decade disruption.
Most of the theorizing by social scientists has largely missed the big
14 This is not very different from how Eisner (2008, p. 270) summarized Weber’s
ideas: “Weber used the term Lebensfu¨hrung . . . or conduct of life [to refer] to a much
wider cultural script encompassing work, politics, beliefs, education, and individual
character. These models of conduct of life become reinforced and stabilized through
institutions such as schools, families, the church, and bureaucracies. In The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber [(1930) 1982] argued that models of conduct
of life can be enormously powerful forces that mold the details of daily action and
shape the trajectories of economic life.”
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picture by focusing only on the aberrational decades of the 1970s and
1980s and the subsequent steep declines.15 By doing so, they miss the
significance of the long-term patterns. Graham Farrell and his col-
leagues (2014), for example, adopt primarily opportunity and routine
activities explanations for the post-1960s crime rise. The argument is
that rates rose because larger quantities of valuable portable goods were
available to be stolen, fewer people were at home during the day to
guard them, and more people moved in public places and thereby be-
came more vulnerable to personal victimization. The post-1990 de-
clines are posited to be the effect of situational crime prevention ini-
tiatives including, notably, automobile theft prevention hardware,
greatly increased use of home security hardware, and a wide variety of
target-hardening and guardianship-enhancing initiatives. There are
two insuperable difficulties. One is that the routine activities arguments
and the situational initiatives, though plausibly related to changes in
burglary and theft rates, are impossibly hard to relate to changes in
rates of lethal and sexual violence. Arguments can be made that re-
ducing property crime rates through instrumental means might delay,
alter, or prevent onset of criminal careers and thereby affect the inci-
dence of other kinds of crimes. However, the notion that there is a
sizable causal relation between involvement in stealing cars or com-
mitting burglaries and the incidence of rape or murder is not credible.
The second problem is that homicide rates in developed countries have
moved in parallel for 50 years. Take-up and timing of situational crime
prevention initiatives have varied widely over time and space. They
cannot be the independent variable that explains changes in homicide
rates.
A separate set of theories focusing on the influence of economic
variables suffers from similar problems.16 Efforts have been made to
15 Farrell et al. (2014) identify 17 theories that have been offered to explain recently
rising crime rates and evaluate them using four tests. These include that the theory
has cross-national validity and must be reconcilable with the crime rate increases of
the 1970s and 1980s. Only one theory passes all four tests.
16 Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008, p. 3) tested all the prevailing American expla-
nations for the fall in crime rates and found that none was generalizable cross-
nationally: “Based on this evaluation, we argue that economists know little about the
empirically relevant determinants of crime. This conclusion applies both to policy
variables like arrest rates or capital punishment and to indirect factors such as abortion
or gun laws. The reason is that even hypotheses that find some support in U.S. data
for recent decades are inconsistent with data over longer horizons or across countries.
Thus, these hypotheses are less persuasive than a focus on recent U.S. evidence might
suggest.”
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explain property crime rates specifically and crime rates generally, and
changes in them, on the basis of national differences in economic var-
iables such as unemployment, inflation, and economic growth (e.g.,
Rosenfeld and Messner 2009; Buonanno, Drago, and Galbiati 2014;
Rosenfeld 2014). Such variables may or may not explain marginal dif-
ferences in property crime rates over time, or even cross-nationally,
but by definition, differences in them cannot explain common cross-
national trends in homicide and other violent crimes. The problem is
the same as that confronting the opportunity theories: the causal chain
from greater or lesser incentives to commit burglaries or thefts to com-
mission of killings and rapes is impossible to draw. Deeper forces of
causal cross-national salience are at work.
Finally, it is no longer reasonable even to hypothesize that crime
patterns can be explained in terms of punishment policies or impris-
onment rates, although many academics, especially economists, try to
do so (e.g., Buonanno et al. 2011). Figure 1, showing nearly identical
homicide and robbery patterns in the United States and Canada but
stable Canadian imprisonment rates and an American quintupling, is
but one of many demonstrations (e.g., Tonry 2007; Lappi-Seppa¨la¨
2008). The most exhaustive recent analyses reach the same conclusion
(Baumer and Wolff 2014; Lappi-Seppa¨la¨ and Lehti 2014).
Lane (1992, p. 33) rightly and presciently observed, at a time when
American crime rates appeared to be rising inexorably, and when little
information was available about crime patterns elsewhere, as follows:
That this is an international phenomenon suggests that most of
the usual parochial explanations for rising crime, whether of the
left or right, do not apply. It is important to stress that neither the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the increas-
ingly black complexion of American cities, nor our national gun
culture have much to do with rising rates in Scandinavia or Aus-
tralia. That the curve was down during the previous century sug-
gests also that neither massive economic change, the disruption of
traditional society, nor waves of immigration, all modern phenom-
ena first experienced during the nineteenth century, can explain
the upsurge either.
What are left to explain long-term and recent trends are broad-based
theories of social control and self-control (e.g., Baumer and Wolff
2014; Eisner 2014).
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As was true in Europe beginning in the late Middle Ages, crime
rates move to deep and broad social forces, and move in parallel, even
if sometimes with lags. That is what happened with major Western
cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and in all developed
Western countries from the 1960s to the 1990s. Since then, rates for
all the traditional crimes of property and violence have fallen substan-
tially in many countries. The appearance of recently rising rates of
nonlethal violence in some European countries will in time be revealed
as an illusion. If I am right, apparent increases in violent crime rates
in Europe should soon peak and then fall, making it clear that trends
are moving in parallel not only in the English-speaking countries but
in all the Western world.
A P P E N D I X
FIG. A1.—Percentages of respondents reporting automobile theft, ICVS, four or five waves,
seven and all participating countries. Source: van Dijk et al. (2007, table 5).
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FIG. A2.—Percentages of respondents reporting personal theft, ICVS, four or five waves, seven and all participating countries. Source: van Dijk et al. (2007,
table 5).
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